Arbeitspapier
Non-Verifiable Emissions, Voluntary Agreements, and Emission Taxes
This paper demonstrates that voluntary agreements between a regulator and an industry can be Pareto superior to environmental taxes. Further, such agreements may differ from direct regulation in a non-trivial way. The first-best optimum may be included in the set of possible agreements, even if it is not attainable using tax instruments. There is no uncertainty or asymmetric information in the model. However, it is assumed that some emissions are observable, but not verifiable. This may be interpreted as a situation where precise formal specification of the pollutant is infeasible.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: Discussion Papers ; No. 214
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Taxation and Subsidies: Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
Industrial Policy; Sectoral Planning Methods
Renewable Resources and Conservation: Government Policy
- Subject
-
Voluntary agreements
Second-best tax
Non-verifiability
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Nyborg, Karine
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
-
Statistics Norway, Research Department
- (where)
-
Oslo
- (when)
-
1998
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET
Data provider
This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Nyborg, Karine
- Statistics Norway, Research Department
Time of origin
- 1998
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