Voluntary Environmental Agreements, Emission Taxes and International Trade: The Importance of the Timing of Strategies
- Standort
-
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main
- Umfang
-
Online-Ressource
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Discussion Papers / Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre und Statistik, Department of Economics ; 562
- Schlagwort
-
Gemeinlastprinzip
Umweltpolitik
Selbstverpflichtung
Umweltabgabe
Umweltsteuer
Spieltheorie
Außenhandelspolitik
Theorie
Wirtschaftspolitik ; Emission ; Steuer
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wo)
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Mannheim
- (wer)
-
Universitätsbibliothek Mannheim
- (wann)
-
1999
- Urheber
- URN
-
urn:nbn:de:bsz:180-madoc-10483
- Rechteinformation
-
Der Zugriff auf das Objekt ist unbeschränkt möglich.
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
16.06.2025, 13:30 MESZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
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Beteiligte
- Conrad, Klaus
- Universitätsbibliothek Mannheim
Entstanden
- 1999
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