Information revelation and coordination using cheap talk in a game with two-sided private information
- Standort
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Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main
- Umfang
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Online-Ressource, 1 online resource.
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Information revelation and coordination using cheap talk in a game with two-sided private information ; day:26 ; month:5 ; year:2023 ; pages:1-36
International journal of game theory ; (26.5.2023), 1-36
- Klassifikation
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Wirtschaft
- Urheber
- Beteiligte Personen und Organisationen
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SpringerLink (Online service)
- DOI
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10.1007/s00182-023-00857-0
- URN
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urn:nbn:de:101:1-2023091108283682834922
- Rechteinformation
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Open Access; Der Zugriff auf das Objekt ist unbeschränkt möglich.
- Letzte Aktualisierung
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14.08.2025, 10:55 MESZ
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Beteiligte
- Ganguly, Chirantan
- Ray, Indrajit
- SpringerLink (Online service)
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