Journal article | Zeitschriftenartikel
Veto players in post-conflict DDR programs: evidence from Nepal and the DRC
Under what conditions are Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) programs successfully implemented following intrastate conflict? Previous research is dominated by under-theorized case studies that lack the ability to detect the precise factors and mechanisms that lead to successful DDR. In this article, we draw on game theory and ask how the number of veto players, their policy distance, and their internal cohesion impact DDR implementation. Using empirical evidence from Nepal and the Democratic Republic of Congo, we show that the number of veto players, rather than their distance and cohesion, explains the (lack of) implementation of DDR.
- ISSN
-
1750-2985
- Umfang
-
Seite(n): 112-130
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Anmerkungen
-
Status: Veröffentlichungsversion; begutachtet (peer reviewed)
- Erschienen in
-
Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding, 13(1)
- Thema
-
Politikwissenschaft
Friedens- und Konfliktforschung, Sicherheitspolitik
Konflikt
Abrüstung
Demobilisierung
Spieltheorie
Nepal
Demokratische Republik Kongo
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Ansorg, Nadine
Strasheim, Julia
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wo)
-
Vereinigtes Königreich
- (wann)
-
2019
- DOI
- URN
-
urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-61804-8
- Rechteinformation
-
GESIS - Leibniz-Institut für Sozialwissenschaften. Bibliothek Köln
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
21.06.2024, 16:26 MESZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
GESIS - Leibniz-Institut für Sozialwissenschaften. Bibliothek Köln. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
GESIS - Leibniz-Institut für Sozialwissenschaften. Bibliothek Köln. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Zeitschriftenartikel
Beteiligte
- Ansorg, Nadine
- Strasheim, Julia
Entstanden
- 2019
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