Arbeitspapier
Designing dynamic research contests
This paper studies the optimal design of dynamic research contests. We introduce interim transfers, which are paid in every period while the contest is ongoing, to an otherwise standard setting. We show that a contest where: (i) the principal can stop the contest in any period, (ii) a constant interim transfer is paid to agents in each period while the contest is ongoing, and (iii) a final prize is paid once the principal stops the contest, is optimal for the principal and implements the first-best.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Working Paper ; No. 235
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Management of Technological Innovation and R&D
Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance: Other
- Thema
-
innovation
dynamic contests
research contests
inducement prizes
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Benkert, Jean-Michel
Letina, Igor
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
University of Zurich, Department of Economics
- (wo)
-
Zurich
- (wann)
-
2019
- DOI
-
doi:10.5167/uzh-126306
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Benkert, Jean-Michel
- Letina, Igor
- University of Zurich, Department of Economics
Entstanden
- 2019
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