The Role of Payoff Parameters for Cooperation in the One-Shot Prisoner's Dilemma

Arbeitspapier

The prisoner's dilemma (PD) is arguably the most important model of social dilemmas, but our knowledge about how a PD's material payoff structure affects cooperation is incomplete. In this paper we investigate the effect of variation in material payoffs on cooperation, focusing on one-shot PD games where efficiency requires mutual cooperation. We report results from three experiments (N = 1,993): in a preliminary experiment, we vary the payoffs over a large range. In our first main experiment (Study 1), we present a novel design that varies payoffs orthogonally in a within-subjects design. Our second main experiment, Study 2, investigates the orthogonal variation of payoffs in a between-subjects design. In a complementary analysis we also study the closely related payoff indices of normalized loss and gain, and the K-index. The most robust finding of our experiments and the complementary analyses is that cooperation in a PD increases with the gains of mutual cooperation over mutual defection.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 16814

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Relation of Economics to Social Values ; Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual
• Thema: prisoner's dilemma ; cooperation ; payoff parameters ; temptation ; risk ; efficiency ; normalized gain ; normalized loss ; K-index ; experiments

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Gächter, Simon ; Lee, Kyeongtae ; Sefton, Martin ; Weber, Till O.
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
• (wo): Bonn
• (wann): 2024

Weitere Informationen

• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ