Artikel
Voting behavior under outside pressure: promoting true majorities with sequential voting?
When including outside pressure on voters as individual costs, sequential voting (as in roll call votes) is theoretically preferable to simultaneous voting (as in recorded ballots). Under complete information, sequential voting has a unique subgame perfect equilibrium with a simple equilibrium strategy guaranteeing true majority results. Simultaneous voting suffers from a plethora of equilibria, often contradicting true majorities. Experimental results, however, show severe deviations from the equilibrium strategy in sequential voting with not significantly more true majority results than in simultaneous voting. Social considerations under sequential voting—based on emotional reactions toward the behaviors of the previous players—seem to distort subgame perfect equilibria.
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Journal: Social Choice and Welfare ; ISSN: 1432-217X ; Volume: 58 ; Year: 2021 ; Issue: 4 ; Pages: 711-740 ; Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer
- Klassifikation
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Wirtschaft
- Thema
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Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods
Public Finance
International Political Economy
Game Theory, Economics, Social and Behav. Sciences
Social Policy
- Ereignis
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
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Bolle, Friedel
Otto, Philipp E.
- Ereignis
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Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
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Springer
- (wo)
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Berlin, Heidelberg
- (wann)
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2021
- DOI
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doi:10.1007/s00355-021-01371-6
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Artikel
Beteiligte
- Bolle, Friedel
- Otto, Philipp E.
- Springer
Entstanden
- 2021
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