Cooperation and Trustworthiness in Repeated Interaction

Konferenzbeitrag

Public goods provision often involves groups of contributors repeatedly interacting with administrators who can extract rents from the pool of contributions. We suggest a novel identification approach that exploits the sequential ordering of decisions in a panel vector autoregressive model to study social interactions in the laboratory. Despite rent extraction, contributors and administrators establish a stable interaction with cooperation matching the level from a comparable Public Goods Game. In the short run, temporary changes in behavior trigger substantial behavioral multiplier effects. We demonstrate that cooperation breeds trustworthiness and vice versa and that one-time disruptions are particularly damaging in settings with a lack of cooperative attitudes and trust.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2014: Evidenzbasierte Wirtschaftspolitik - Session: Public Goods ; No. E03-V3 (Revised Version: February 2015)

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Multiple or Simultaneous Equation Models: Time-Series Models; Dynamic Quantile Regressions; Dynamic Treatment Effect Models; Diffusion Processes; State Space Models ; Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual ; Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior ; Public Goods
• Subject: Cooperation ; trustworthiness ; rent extraction ; methods for laboratory experiments ; panel vector autoregressive model

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Cagala, Tobias ; Glogowsky, Ulrich ; Grimm, Veronika ; Rincke, Johannes
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
• (where): Kiel und Hamburg
• (when): 2015

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/107597
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET