Konferenzbeitrag

Preference Intensities in Repeated Collective Decision-Making

We study decision rules for committees that repeatedly take a binary decision. Committee members are privately informed about their payoffs and monetary transfers are not feasible. In static environments, the only strategy-proof mechanisms are voting rules which are criticized for being inefficient as they do not condition on preference intensities. The dynamic structure of repeated decision-making allows for richer decision rules that overcome this inefficiency by making use of information on preference intensities. Nonetheless, we show that often simple voting is optimal for two-person committees. This holds for many prior type distributions and irrespective of the agents' patience.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2013: Wettbewerbspolitik und Regulierung in einer globalen Wirtschaftsordnung - Session: Collective Decisions and Aggregation ; No. B12-V1

Classification
Wirtschaft
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Optimization Techniques; Programming Models; Dynamic Analysis

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Drexl, Moritz
Kleiner, Andreas
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
(where)
Kiel und Hamburg
(when)
2013

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Konferenzbeitrag

Associated

  • Drexl, Moritz
  • Kleiner, Andreas
  • ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft

Time of origin

  • 2013

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