A simple dynamic climate cooperation model

Konferenzbeitrag

A standard result from the game theoretic literature on international environmental agreements is that coalitions are either `broad but shallow' or `narrow but deep'. Hence, the stable coalition size is small when the potential welfare gains are large. We modify a standard climate coalition game by adding a - seemingly - small but realistic feature: we allow countries to delay climate negotiations until the next `round' if a coalition forms but decides to remain inactive. It turns out that results are surprisingly different under this modification. In particular, a large coalition with deep emissions cuts forms if countries are sufficiently patient. Our results also indicate that countries should try hard to overcome coordination problems in the formation of a coalition. A more cooperative outcome may then be reached, and it may be reached more quickly.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2016: Demographischer Wandel - Session: International Climate Policy ; No. D15-V3

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Externalities ; International Agreements and Observance; International Organizations ; Climate; Natural Disasters and Their Management; Global Warming

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Schmidt, Robert ; Kovac, Eugen
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
• (wo): Kiel und Hamburg
• (wann): 2016

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/145481
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ