Arbeitspapier

Co-Investment, Uncertainty, and Opportunism: Ex-Ante and Ex-Post Remedies

In this paper, we study the impact of co-investment by incumbents and entrants on the roll-out of network infrastructures under demand uncertainty. We show that if entrants can wait to co-invest until demand is realized, the incumbents' investment incentives are reduced and total coverage can be lower than in a benchmark with earlier co-investment. We consider two remedies to correct these distortions: (i) co-investment options purchased ex-ante by entrants from incumbents, and (ii) risk premia paid ex-post by entrants. We show that co-investment options cannot fully reestablish total coverage, while premia can do so in most cases, though at the cost of less entry. Finally, we show that an appropriate combination of ex-ante and ex-post remedies can improve welfare.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 8078

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Telecommunications
Economics of Regulation
Thema
co-investment
uncertainty
opportunism
options
risk premia

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Bourreau, Marc
Cambini, Carlo
Hoernig, Steffen
Vogelsang, Ingo
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(wo)
Munich
(wann)
2020

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Bourreau, Marc
  • Cambini, Carlo
  • Hoernig, Steffen
  • Vogelsang, Ingo
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Entstanden

  • 2020

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