Arbeitspapier
Coalition Governments in a Model of Parliamentary Democracy
We analyze the relative importance of party ideology and rents from office in the formation of coalitions in a parliamentary democracy. In equilibrium, the types of coalitions that are formed may be minimal winning, minority or surplus and they may be ideologically `disconnected'. The coalitions that form depend upon the relative importance of rents of office and seat shares of the parties. If rents are high, governments cannot be surplus. With low rents or the formateur close to the median, minority governments occur for a wider ideological dispersion. Further, there is a non-monotonic relationship between connectedness of coalitions and rents.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Nota di Lavoro ; No. 83.2006
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Structure and Scope of Government: Other
- Thema
-
Coalitions
Ideology
Rents
Regierungskoalition
Parlamentarismus
Ideologie
Politische Partei
Rententheorie
Theorie
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Bandyopadhyay, Siddhartha
Oak, Mandar
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
- (wo)
-
Milano
- (wann)
-
2006
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Bandyopadhyay, Siddhartha
- Oak, Mandar
- Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
Entstanden
- 2006