Arbeitspapier

Coalition Governments in a Model of Parliamentary Democracy

We analyze the relative importance of party ideology and rents from office in the formation of coalitions in a parliamentary democracy. In equilibrium, the types of coalitions that are formed may be minimal winning, minority or surplus and they may be ideologically `disconnected'. The coalitions that form depend upon the relative importance of rents of office and seat shares of the parties. If rents are high, governments cannot be surplus. With low rents or the formateur close to the median, minority governments occur for a wider ideological dispersion. Further, there is a non-monotonic relationship between connectedness of coalitions and rents.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Nota di Lavoro ; No. 83.2006

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Structure and Scope of Government: Other
Thema
Coalitions
Ideology
Rents
Regierungskoalition
Parlamentarismus
Ideologie
Politische Partei
Rententheorie
Theorie

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Bandyopadhyay, Siddhartha
Oak, Mandar
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
(wo)
Milano
(wann)
2006

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Bandyopadhyay, Siddhartha
  • Oak, Mandar
  • Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)

Entstanden

  • 2006

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