Coalition governments and policy reform with asymmetric information

Arbeitspapier

With ideological parties being better informed about the state of the world than voters, the true motivation of policy proposals is hard to judge for the electorate. However, if reform proposals have to be agreed upon by coalition parties, it may become possible for the government to signal to the voters its private information about the necessity of reforms. Therefore, in coalition governments reforms will be more in line with policy requirements than in single-party governments. This is usually beneficial for the coalition parties as well as for the voter.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Darmstadt Discussion Papers in Economics ; No. 192

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior ; Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation ; Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
• Subject: Asymmetric information ; coalition governments ; policy reform ; Politische Reform ; Politische Entscheidung ; Regierungskoalition ; Asymmetrische Information ; Politisches Ziel ; Wahlverhalten

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Helm, Carsten ; Neugart, Michael
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Technische Universität Darmstadt, Department of Law and Economics
• (where): Darmstadt
• (when): 2008

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/32086
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET