Arbeitspapier
Easy targets and the timing of conflict
Contestants have to choose whether to initiate a contest or war, or whether to remain peaceful for another period. We find that agents wait and initiate the contest once their rival is sufficiently weak to be an easy target.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: cege Discussion Papers ; No. 21
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
History of Economic Thought: Individuals
Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism; Secession
- Thema
-
Timing of conflict
war
easy targets
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Bester, Helmut
Konrad, Kai A.
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
University of Göttingen, Center for European, Governance and Economic Development Research (cege)
- (wo)
-
Göttingen
- (wann)
-
2003
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Bester, Helmut
- Konrad, Kai A.
- University of Göttingen, Center for European, Governance and Economic Development Research (cege)
Entstanden
- 2003
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