Labor markets and capital tax competition

Arbeitspapier

Ogawa et al. (2006) analyze capital tax competition in a fixed-wage approach and show that the original results of Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986) are not preserved in the presence of unemployment. In the present paper we challenge this view and investigate capital tax competition for some arbitrary institutional setting of the labor market. We find that if the labor market is characterized by some efficient bargaining solution, the results of Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986) are preserved.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 3099

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Taxation and Subsidies: Efficiency; Optimal Taxation ; Trade Unions: Objectives, Structure, and Effects
• Subject: capital tax competition ; unemployment ; efficient bargains ; Kapitalertragsteuer ; Steuerwettbewerb ; Arbeitslosigkeit ; Arbeitsmarktflexibilisierung ; Lohnverhandlungstheorie ; Theorie

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Eichner, Thomas ; Upmann, Thorsten
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
• (where): Munich
• (when): 2010

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/38957
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET