Cost-effective unilateral climate policy design: Size Matters

Arbeitspapier

Given the bleak prospects for a global agreement on mitigating climate change, pressure for unilateral abatement is increasing. A major challenge is emissions leakage. Border carbon adjustments and output-based allocation of emissions allowances can increase effectiveness of unilateral action but introduce distortions of their own. We assess antileakage measures as a function of abatement coalition size. We first develop a partial equilibrium analytical framework to see how these instruments affect emissions within and outside the coalition. We then employ a computable general equilibrium model of international trade and energy use to assess the strategies as the coalition grows. We find that full border adjustments rank first in global cost-effectiveness, followed by import tariffs and output-based rebates. The differences across measures and their overall appeal decline as the abatement coalition grows. In terms of cost, the coalition countries prefer border carbon adjustments; countries outside the coalition prefer output-based rebates.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Discussion Papers ; No. 664

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Energy and the Macroeconomy ; Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
• Thema: emissions leakage ; border carbon adjustments ; output-based allocation

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Böhringer, Christoph ; Fischer, Carolyn ; Rosendahl, Knut Einar
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Statistics Norway, Research Department
• (wo): Oslo
• (wann): 2011

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/192646
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ