Arbeitspapier
Tax Evasion and Social Interactions
The paper extends the standard tax evasion model by allowing for social interactions. In Manski?s (1993) nomenclature, our model takes into account social conformity effects (i.e., endogenous interactions), fairness effects (i.e., exogenous interactions) and sorting effects (i.e., correlated effects). Our model is tested using experimental data. Participants must decide how much income to report given their tax rate and audit probability, and given those faced by the other members of their group as well as their mean reported income. The estimation is based on a two-limit simultaneous tobit with fixed group effects. A unique social equilibrium exists when the model satisfies coherency conditions. In line with Brock and Durlauf (2001b), the intrinsic nonlinearity between individual and group responses is sufficient to identify the model without imposing any exclusion restrictions. Our results are consistent with fairness effects but reject social conformity and correlated effects.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 1359
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology; Language; Social and Economic Stratification
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior
Single Equation Models; Single Variables: Truncated and Censored Models; Switching Regression Models; Threshold Regression Models
Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
Tax Evasion and Avoidance
- Subject
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social interactions
tax evasion
simultaneous tobit
laboratory experiments
Steuerkriminalität
Soziale Beziehungen
Soziale Norm
Gerechtigkeit
Experiment
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Fortin, Bernard
Lacroix, Guy
Villeval, Marie-Claire
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
- (where)
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Bonn
- (when)
-
2004
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET
Data provider
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Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Fortin, Bernard
- Lacroix, Guy
- Villeval, Marie-Claire
- Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
Time of origin
- 2004
Other Objects (12)
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Tax Morale and Tax Evasion: Social Preferences and Bounded Rationality
Tax Progressivity and Tax Evasion
Welfare Improving Tax Evasion
Tax evasion by firms
Tax evasion by individuals
Productivity and Tax Evasion
Tax evasion and trust
Tax Evasion on a Social Network
Collusive Tax Evasion and Social Norms
Tax Evasion on a Social Network
Fair tax evasion
Timing Tax Evasion
Tax Morale and Tax Evasion: Social Preferences and Bounded Rationality
Tax Progressivity and Tax Evasion
Welfare Improving Tax Evasion
Tax evasion by firms
Tax evasion by individuals
Productivity and Tax Evasion
Tax evasion and trust
Tax Evasion on a Social Network
Collusive Tax Evasion and Social Norms
Tax Evasion on a Social Network
Fair tax evasion
Timing Tax Evasion
Tax Morale and Tax Evasion: Social Preferences and Bounded Rationality
Tax Progressivity and Tax Evasion
Welfare Improving Tax Evasion
Tax evasion by firms
Tax evasion by individuals
Productivity and Tax Evasion