The Strategic Use of Private Quality Standards in Vertical Relations

Konferenzbeitrag

This paper highlights the strategic role of private quality standards in vertical relations. Considering two symmetric downstream firms that are exclusively supplied by a finite number of upstream firms, we show that there exist asymmetric equilibria in the downstream firms' quality requirements. While one downstream firm has an incentive to exaggerate her quality requirements to weaken her suppliers' outside options, the competitor's best response is to reduce her own quality requirements. The higher (lower) quality standard is set above (below) the social optimum. It turns out that the use of private quality standards induces a decrease in social welfare.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2010: Ökonomie der Familie - Session: Two-Sided Markets and Vertical Restraints ; No. E8-V3

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Information and Product Quality; Standardization and Compatibility ; Vertical Restraints; Resale Price Maintenance; Quantity Discounts ; Agricultural Markets and Marketing; Cooperatives; Agribusiness
• Thema: Private Quality Standards ; Vertical Relations ; Buyer Power ; Food Supply Chain

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Teichmann, Isabel ; von Schlippenbach, Vanessa
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Verein für Socialpolitik
• (wo): Frankfurt a. M.
• (wann): 2010

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/37419
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ