Evasive Lying in Strategic Communication

Konferenzbeitrag

In a sender-receiver game we investigate if sanctions for lying induce more truth-telling. Senders may not only choose between truth-telling and (explicit) lying, but may also engage in evasive lying by credibly pretending not to know. Sanctions promote truth-telling if senders cannot engage in evasive lying. If evasive lying is possible, explicit lying is largely substituted by evasive lying, in line with the notion that evasive lying is perceived as sufficiently less psychologically costly.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2017: Alternative Geld- und Finanzarchitekturen - Session: Experiments - Games II ; No. B18-V2

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual ; Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design ; Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Khalmetski, Kiryl ; Rockenbach, Bettina ; Werner, Peter
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
• (where): Kiel, Hamburg
• (when): 2017

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/168119
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET