Surprising Gifts: Theory and Laboratory Evidence

Konferenzbeitrag

People do not only feel guilt from not living up to others expectations (Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2007)), but may also like to exceed them. We propose a model that generalizes the guilt aversion model to capture the possibility of positive surprises when making gifts. A model extension allows decision makers to care about others' attribution of intentions behind surprises. We test the model in two dictator game experiments. Experiment 1 shows a strong causal effect of recipients expectations on dictators transfers. Moreover, in line with our model, the correlation between transfers and expectations can be both, positive and negative, obscuring the effect in the aggregate. Experiment 2 shows that dictators care about what recipients know about the intentions behind surprises.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2015: Ökonomische Entwicklung - Theorie und Politik - Session: Tax experiments ; No. E15-V2

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual ; Altruism; Philanthropy; Intergenerational Transfers ; Expectations; Speculations

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Werner, Peter ; Khalmetski, Kiryl ; Ockenfels, Axel
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (when): 2015

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/113006
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET