Arbeitspapier

Risk Aversion, Insurance, and the Efficiency-Equality Tradeoff

Under conditions of informational asymmetry, redistributing the property rights may improve work incentives but lead to an inefficient choice of entrepreneurial risk. We present a model in which reassignment of property rights does not affect factor prices and we show that there exist egalitarian asset redistributions that enhance allocative efficiency. The scope for such redistributions can be broadened by offering fair insurance protecting the independent entrepreneur against risk unassociated with the production process and against production uncertainties that are unrelated to the quality of their individual decisions. The market will generally supply insurance of this type suboptimally.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Working Paper ; No. 2000-03

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Bowles, Samuel
Gintis, Herbert
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
University of Massachusetts, Department of Economics
(wo)
Amherst, MA
(wann)
2000

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Bowles, Samuel
  • Gintis, Herbert
  • University of Massachusetts, Department of Economics

Entstanden

  • 2000

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