Arbeitspapier

Improving the Equity-Efficiency Trade-off: Mandatory Savings Accounts for Social Insurance

In the modern welfare state a substantial part of an individual's tax bill is transferred back to the same individual taxpayer in the form of social transfers. This provides a rationale for financing part of social insurance through mandatory savings accounts. We analyze the behavioral and welfare effects of compulsory savings accounts in an intertemporal model with uncertainty, endogenous involuntary unemployment and retirement decisions, credit constraints, and heterogeneous agents. We show that the introduction of (early) retirement and unemployment accounts generates a Pareto improvement by enabling the government to provide lifetime income insurance and liquidity insurance in a more efficient manner.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 1041

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Bovenberg, Lans
Sørensen, Peter Birch
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(wo)
Munich
(wann)
2003

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Bovenberg, Lans
  • Sørensen, Peter Birch
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Entstanden

  • 2003

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