Federalism and accountability with distorted election choices

Arbeitspapier

This study analyzes the interaction between distorted election choices and the architecture of government with a focus on the implications for the accountability of politicians. Contrasting centralized with decentralized political systems, it is shown that centralization is likely to result in higher accountability if election choices are subject to small random distortions. Furthermore, equity and efficiency arguments for uniform policies in centralized systems are derived as these are likely to result in the better overall performance of politicians and in more equal performance across regions.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Volkswirtschaftliche Diskussionsbeiträge ; No. 130-09

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations: Interjurisdictional Differentials and Their Effects ; Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
• Subject: accountability ; federalism ; decentralization ; retrospective voting ; Föderalismus ; Zentralstaat ; Wiederwahl ; Vergleich ; Abstimmungsparadoxon ; Theorie

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Kessing, Sebastian G.
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Universität Siegen, Fakultät III, Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Wirtschaftsinformatik und Wirtschaftsrecht
• (where): Siegen
• (when): 2009

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/41078
• URN: urn:nbn:de:101:1-201101244247
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET