Artikel
Optimal dynamic matching
We study a dynamic matching environment where individuals arrive sequentially. There is a tradeoff between waiting for a thicker market, allowing for higher-quality matches, and minimizing agents' waiting costs. The optimal mechanism cumulates a stock of incongruent pairs up to a threshold and matches all others in an assortative fashion instantaneously. In discretionary settings, a similar protocol ensues in equilibrium, but expected queues are inefficiently long. We quantify the welfare gain from centralization, which can be substantial, even for low waiting costs. We also evaluate welfare improvements generated by alternative priority protocols.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Journal: Theoretical Economics ; ISSN: 1555-7561 ; Volume: 15 ; Year: 2020 ; Issue: 3 ; Pages: 1221-1278 ; New Haven, CT: The Econometric Society
- Klassifikation
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Wirtschaft
Market Design
- Thema
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Dynamic matching
mechanism design
organ donation
market design
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Baccara, Mariagiovanna
Lee, SangMok
Yariv, Leeat
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
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The Econometric Society
- (wo)
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New Haven, CT
- (wann)
-
2020
- DOI
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doi:10.3982/TE3740
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Artikel
Beteiligte
- Baccara, Mariagiovanna
- Lee, SangMok
- Yariv, Leeat
- The Econometric Society
Entstanden
- 2020
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