Arbeitspapier
Better protected, better paid: evidence on how employment protection affects wages
This paper empirically establishes the effect of the employer's term of notice on the wage level of employees. The term of notice is defined as the period an employer has to notify workers in advance of their up-coming dismissal. The wages paid during this period are an important element of firing costs and hence employment protection. To find a causal effect, I exploit the exogenous change in the term of notice that resulted from the introduction of a new Dutch law in 1999. Strong evidence is found that a longer 'dormant' term of notice leads to higher wages. In my sample, an additional month of notice increases wages by three percent, ceteris paribus.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 3352
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Single Equation Models; Single Variables: Panel Data Models; Spatio-temporal Models
- Thema
-
Employment protection
wages
fixed effects
Lohnniveau
Kündigungsschutz
Reform
Wirkungsanalyse
Lohn
Niederlande
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
van der Wiel, Karen
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
- (wo)
-
Bonn
- (wann)
-
2008
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- van der Wiel, Karen
- Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
Entstanden
- 2008
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