Buyers' workload and R&D procurement outcomes: Evidence from the US Air Force Research Lab

Arbeitspapier

Does workload constitute a bottleneck to a public agency's mission, and if so, to what extent? We ask these questions in the context of the US government's procurement of R&D. We link tender, contract, patent, and office records to the identity of the officer responsible for the procurement process to estimate how workload in the federal acquisition unit affects the execution of R&D contracts. The identification comes from unanticipated retirement shifts among contracting officers, which we use to instrument workload. We find a large increase in patenting at the extensive margin when the same officer is exposed to a declining workload. In our sample, an additional contracting officer in the procurement unit, holding fixed the procurement budget and number of purchases, leads to a two percentage point increase in the probability for an R&D contract to generate patents. We provide suggestive evidence that backlogged contracting officers are unable to devote enough time to tender and contract specifications.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: ZEW Discussion Papers ; No. 21-059

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights ; National Government Expenditures and Related Policies: Procurement ; Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives ; Management of Technological Innovation and R&D
• Subject: Workload ; Public Procurement ; Contracting Officer ; R&D ; Patents

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Giuffrida, Leonardo M. ; Raiteri, Emilio
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): ZEW - Leibniz-Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung
• (where): Mannheim
• (when): 2021

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/236635
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET