Arbeitspapier
Strategic Interaction Between the Fiscal and Monetary Authorities Under Inflation Targeting
This paper studies the strategic interaction between the fiscal and monetary authorities when the monetary policymaker pursues an underlying inflation target. Given that monetary policy is transparent and the fiscal policymaker can commit to a particular policy stance, the Stackelberg equilibrium can be implemented. If the conditions for Stackelberg leadership is not present, policies may end up in a Nash equilibrium, resulting in excessive interest and exchange rate volatility. Legislative restrictions on fiscal policy may then be stabilising, whereas they may be counterproductive in the Stackelberg case.
- ISBN
-
82-7553-166-7
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Arbeidsnotat ; No. 2000/9
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination
Comparative or Joint Analysis of Fiscal and Monetary Policy; Stabilization; Treasury Policy
Monetary Systems; Standards; Regimes; Government and the Monetary System; Payment Systems
Monetary Policy
- Thema
-
small open economy
inflation targeting
policy coordination
policy interdependencies
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Leitemo, Kai
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Norges Bank
- (wo)
-
Oslo
- (wann)
-
2000
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Leitemo, Kai
- Norges Bank
Entstanden
- 2000
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