Who decides to regulate? Lobbying activity in the U.S. cellular industry

Abstract: "How does the choice to regulate a market take place? And how does regulation influence market outcome? We argue that to explicitly model the simultaneity between these two issues makes a qualitative difference in the analysis of the role of regulation, and empirically test our model in the U.S. mobile telecommunications industry. We find support for our approach: regulatory choice should be considered endogenous. We show that, correcting for the simultaneity, regulation's overall effect should have been a reduction of cellular tariffs. However, this result is not highly significant. Our explanation for this finding is that firms' lobbying activity on regulatory choice has been successful: some firms were able to avoid regulation in those market where it would have significantly reduced prices. We argue that this is the real source of the found simultaneity. Moreover, we provide evidence that the probability of regulation was higher, other things equal, when the regulator was appoi

Object Details

• Alternative title: Wer entscheidet zu regulieren? Lobbying-Aktivität in der U.S.-amerikanischen Mobilfunk-Industrie
• Location: Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main
• Extent: Online-Ressource, 39 S.
• Language: Englisch
• Notes: Veröffentlichungsversion

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Discussion Papers / Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung, Forschungsschwerpunkt Marktprozeß und Unternehmensentwicklung, Abteilung Wettbewerbsfähigkeit und industrieller Wandel ; Bd. 00-05

Classification and Topics

• Keyword: Mobile Telekommunikation ; Telekommunikationspolitik ; Interessenpolitik ; Wirkungsanalyse ; Marktverhalten ; Schätzung ; :z Geschichte 1984-1988 ; USA

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (where): Berlin
• (when): 2000
• Creator: Duso, Tomaso
• Contributor: Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung gGmbH

Further information

• URN: urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-115864
• Rights: Open Access unbekannt; Open Access; Der Zugriff auf das Objekt ist unbeschränkt möglich.
• Last update: 15.08.2025, 7:20 AM CEST