Monografie
Who decides to regulate? Lobbying activity in the U.S. cellular industry
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Identifier
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oai:gesis.izsoz.de:document/11586
1190974878
- Reihe
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Discussion Papers / Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung, Forschungsschwerpunkt Marktprozeß und Unternehmensentwicklung, Abteilung Wettbewerbsfähigkeit und industrieller Wandel; Bd. 00-05
Thema
Wirtschaft; Mobile Telekommunikation; Mobilfunk; Telekommunikationspolitik; Interessenpolitik; Wirkungsanalyse; Marktverhalten; Schätzung; Geschichte 1984-1988
Beteiligte Personen und Organisationen
- URN
- Rechteinformation
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Der Zugriff auf das Objekt ist unbeschränkt möglich.
- Letzte Aktualisierung
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26.01.2023, 13:57 MEZ
Objekttyp
- Monografie
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