Arbeitspapier

Pension incentives, labor supply and heterogenous pension systems

People with an uncertain health condition might face a double worry. They fear to get disabled, and if they are disabled, that they will receive a low pension. To keep their health they should work less. To improve their disability pension they should work more. This paper demonstrates that the latter effect is the strongest empirically. Thus to protect one self against the income loss of a bad event, the bad event is more likely to happen. Comparing register data from disabled and non-disabled individuals shows that being disabled increases income in the last year before the time of disablement. Further, more generous pension systems increase pre-disablement income even more.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Memorandum ; No. 2008,18

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Thema
Erwerbsunfähigkeitsrente
Einkommen
Gesundheit
Arbeitsangebot
Norwegen

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Holen, Dag S.
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
University of Oslo, Department of Economics
(wo)
Oslo
(wann)
2008

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Holen, Dag S.
  • University of Oslo, Department of Economics

Entstanden

  • 2008

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