Pension reform and labor market incentives

Arbeitspapier

This paper investigates how parametric reform in a pay-as-you-go pension system with a tax benefit link affects retirement and work incentives of prime-age workers. We find that postponed retirement tends to harm incentives of prime-age workers in the presence of a tax benefit link, thereby creating a policy trade-off in stimulating aggregate labor supply. We show how several popular reform scenarios are geared either towards young or old workers, or, indeed, both groups under appropriate conditions. We also provide a sharp characterization of the excess burden of pension insurance and show how it depends on the behavioral supply elasticities of the extensive and intensive margins and the effective tax rates implicit in contribution rates.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 2057

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Social Security and Public Pensions ; Retirement; Retirement Policies
• Thema: Rentenreform ; Altersgrenze ; Arbeitsangebot ; Ökonomischer Anreiz ; Steuer ; Gesetzliche Rentenversicherung ; Excess Burden ; Theorie

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Fisher, Walter H. ; Keuschnigg, Christian
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
• (wo): Munich
• (wann): 2007

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/26102
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ