Linear social interactions models

Arbeitspapier

This paper provides a systematic analysis of identification in linear social interactions models. This is both a theoretical and an econometric exercise as the analysis is linked to a rigorously delineated model of interdependent decisions. We develop an incomplete information game that describes individual choices in the presence of social interactions. The equilibrium strategy profiles are linear. Standard models in the empirical social interactions literature are shown to be exact or approximate special cases of our general framework, which in turn provides a basis for understanding the microeconomic foundations of those models. We consider identification of both endogenous (peer) and contextual social effects under alternative assumptions on a priori information about network structure available to an analyst, and contrast the informational content of individual-level and aggregated data. Finally, we discuss potential ramifications for identification of endogenous group selection and differences between the information sets of analysts and agents.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Reihe Ökonomie / Economics Series ; No. 298

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Single Equation Models; Single Variables: Cross-Sectional Models; Spatial Models; Treatment Effect Models; Quantile Regressions ; Single Equation Models; Single Variables: Panel Data Models; Spatio-temporal Models ; Multiple or Simultaneous Equation Models: Cross-Sectional Models; Spatial Models; Treatment Effect Models; Quantile Regressions; Social Interaction Models ; Multiple or Simultaneous Equation Models: Discrete Regression and Qualitative Choice Models; Discrete Regressors; Proportions ; Noncooperative Games ; Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology; Language; Social and Economic Stratification
• Thema: Social interactions ; identification ; incomplete information games ; Soziale Beziehungen ; Soziales Verhalten ; Unvollkommene Information ; Nichtkooperatives Spiel ; Theorie

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Blume, Lawrence E. ; Brock, William A. ; Durlauf, Steven N. ; Jayaraman, Rajshri
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Institute for Advanced Studies (IHS)
• (wo): Vienna
• (wann): 2013

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/97429
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ