Arbeitspapier | Working paper
On the profitability of collusion in location games
"Die Autoren untersuchen Kollusion in Märkten, in denen die einzige strategische Variable der Akteure ihre Ortswahl ist. Für Spiele in k-dimensionalen Euklidischen Räumen mit massepunktfreien Verteilungen zeigen sie, dass Kollusion nur profitabel sein kann, wenn wenigstens die Hälfte aller Akteure kolludieren. Für Wettbewerb auf dem Einheitsintervall, dem Einheitskreis und dem Einheitsquadrat etablieren die Autoren hinreichende Bedingungen für die Profitabilität von Kollusion." (Autorenreferat)
- Alternative title
-
Zur Profitabilität von Kollusion in Standortspielen
- Extent
-
Seite(n): 12
- Language
-
Englisch
- Notes
-
Status: Veröffentlichungsversion
- Bibliographic citation
-
Discussion Papers / Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung, Forschungsschwerpunkt Markt und politische Ökonomie (02-22)
- Subject
-
Wirtschaft
Volkswirtschaftslehre
Theorie
Marktmechanismus
Standort
Profitprinzip
Modellentwicklung
Wettbewerb
Grundlagenforschung
Theoriebildung
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Huck, Steffen
Knoblauch, Vicki
Müller, Wieland
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
-
Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung gGmbH
- (where)
-
Deutschland, Berlin
- (when)
-
2002
- URN
-
urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-113168
- Rights
-
GESIS - Leibniz-Institut für Sozialwissenschaften. Bibliothek Köln
- Last update
-
21.06.2024, 4:26 PM CEST
Data provider
This object is provided by:
GESIS - Leibniz-Institut für Sozialwissenschaften. Bibliothek Köln. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
GESIS - Leibniz-Institut für Sozialwissenschaften. Bibliothek Köln. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Huck, Steffen
- Knoblauch, Vicki
- Müller, Wieland
- Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung gGmbH
Time of origin
- 2002
Other Objects (12)
Merger profitability and trade policy
On the profitability of collusion in location games
On the profitability of collusion in location games
Merger and collusion in contests
From imitation to collusion: long-run learning in a low-information environment
Moral cost, commitment, and committee size
Institutionalizing eurozone exit: a modified NEWNEY approach
Matching donations without crowding out? Some theoretical considerations, a field, and a lab experiment
Who knows it is a game? On strategic awareness and cognitive ability
Strategic trade policy and the home bias in firm ownership structure
Crop failures and export tariffs
Markets for leaked information
Merger profitability and trade policy
On the profitability of collusion in location games
On the profitability of collusion in location games
Merger and collusion in contests
From imitation to collusion: long-run learning in a low-information environment
Moral cost, commitment, and committee size
Institutionalizing eurozone exit: a modified NEWNEY approach
Matching donations without crowding out? Some theoretical considerations, a field, and a lab experiment
Who knows it is a game? On strategic awareness and cognitive ability
Strategic trade policy and the home bias in firm ownership structure
Crop failures and export tariffs
Markets for leaked information
Merger profitability and trade policy
On the profitability of collusion in location games
On the profitability of collusion in location games
Merger and collusion in contests
From imitation to collusion: long-run learning in a low-information environment
Moral cost, commitment, and committee size
Institutionalizing eurozone exit: a modified NEWNEY approach
Matching donations without crowding out? Some theoretical considerations, a field, and a lab experiment
Who knows it is a game? On strategic awareness and cognitive ability
Strategic trade policy and the home bias in firm ownership structure
Crop failures and export tariffs