Arbeitspapier

Publicly Provided Unemployment Insurance and Commitment

A model is constructed in which, given the inability of implicit contracts to be self-enforcing, a minimum wage policy combined with unemployment insurance can be welfare-improving. Unemployment insurance can be decentralized to the private sector if the government can commit to a minimum wage. However, if it cannot , a government which acts in the interest of the workers will have an incentive to increase the minimum wage to exploit private insurers. The full commitment optimum can be achieved by publicly provided unemployment insurance.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Queen's Economics Department Working Paper ; No. 831

Classification
Wirtschaft

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Boadway, Robin
Marceau, Nicolas
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Queen's University, Department of Economics
(where)
Kingston (Ontario)
(when)
1991

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Boadway, Robin
  • Marceau, Nicolas
  • Queen's University, Department of Economics

Time of origin

  • 1991

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