Arbeitspapier

Jobs Cronyism in Public-Sector Firms

Politicians can use the public sector to give jobs to cronies, at the expense of the efficiency of those organisations and general welfare. In this paper, we regress monthly hires across all firms in Portugal with some degree of public ownership on the country's 1980-2018 political cycle. We find that public-sector appointments increase significantly over the months just after elections but only if the new government is of a different political colour than its predecessor. These results are consistent with a simple model of cronyism and hold in multiple robustness checks. Overall, we find our evidence to be consistent with politically-induced misallocation of public resources.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: GLO Discussion Paper ; No. 624

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Public Sector Labor Markets
Structure, Scope, and Performance of Government
Labor Demand
Thema
Corruption
matched employer-employee panel data
public-sector employment

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Martins, Pedro S.
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Global Labor Organization (GLO)
(wo)
Essen
(wann)
2020

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Martins, Pedro S.
  • Global Labor Organization (GLO)

Entstanden

  • 2020

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