Legal Unbundling can be a Golden Mean between Vertical Integration and Separation

Arbeitspapier

We study an industry in which an upstream monopolist supplies an essential input at a regulated price to several downstream firms. Legal unbundling means that a downstream firm owns the upstream firm but this upstream firm is legally independent and maximizes its own upstream profits. We allow for non-tariff discrimination by the upstream firm and show that under quite general conditions legal unbundling yields (weakly) higher quantities in the downstream market than vertical separation and integration. Therefore, typically consumer surplus will be largest under legal unbundling. Outcomes under legal unbundling are still advantageous when we allow for discriminatory capacity investments, investments into marginal cost reduction and investments into network reliability. If access prices are unregulated, however, legal unbundling may be quite undesirable.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Bonn Econ Discussion Papers ; No. 15/2007

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Vertical Restraints; Resale Price Maintenance; Quantity Discounts ; Legal Monopolies and Regulation or Deregulation ; Economics of Regulation
• Thema: Network industries ; regulation ; vertical relations ; investments ; ownership ; sabotage ; Vertikale Konzentration ; Lieferanten-Kunden-Beziehung ; Netzzugang ; Unternehmensentflechtung ; Monopol ; Investition ; Eigentum ; Theorie

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Höffler, Felix ; Kranz, Sebastian
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE)
• (wo): Bonn
• (wann): 2007

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/27156
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ