Arbeitspapier

Regulatory unbundling in telecommunications

Due to its dynamic nature, and the increasing importance of competitive sub-parts, the telecommunications sector provides particularly interesting insights for studying regulatory unbundling. Based on the theory of monopolistic bottle-necks the fallacies of overregulation by undue unbundling obligations are indicated. Neither the promotion of infrastructure competition by mandatory un-bundling of competitive subparts of telecommunications infrastructure, nor regulatory induced network fragmentation within monopolistic bottleneck com-ponents is justified. The impact of the shrinking of the areas of network specific market power on the remaining unbundling regulation is analyzed. Finally, the phasing-out potentials of unbundling regulation in European telecommunica-tions markets are pointed out.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Diskussionsbeitrag ; No. 137

Classification
Wirtschaft

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Knieps, Günter
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Albert-Ludwigs-Universität Freiburg, Institut für Verkehrswissenschaft und Regionalpolitik
(where)
Freiburg i. Br.
(when)
2011

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Knieps, Günter
  • Albert-Ludwigs-Universität Freiburg, Institut für Verkehrswissenschaft und Regionalpolitik

Time of origin

  • 2011

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