R&D and Production Behavior of Asymmetric Duopoly Subject to Knowledge Spillovers

Arbeitspapier

We construct an asymmetri c duopolistic R&D and production behavior model subject to knowledge spillovers. This model is an extension to the symmetric model of d'Aspremont and Jacquemin (A&J (1988)) and aims to determine the cooperative and non-cooperative R&D strategies for two agents of different size. The paper concludes that the introduction of asymmetry into the A&J (1988) model leads to different R&D expenditures and production decisions made by the firms. Simulations show that the bigger agent has larger R&D expenditures and higher output. If firms choose the monopoly collusion or the welfare-maximizing strategy, the optimal solution implies that R&D is conducted asymmetrically by both agents, but that production is conducted only by the largest agent.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 287

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft
• Subject: Innovation ; R&D ; spillovers ; cooperation

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Plasmans, Joseph
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
• (where): Munich
• (when): 2000

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/75661
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET