R&D and Production Behavior of Asymmetric Duopoly Subject to Knowledge Spillovers

Arbeitspapier

We construct an asymmetri c duopolistic R&D and production behavior model subject to knowledge spillovers. This model is an extension to the symmetric model of d'Aspremont and Jacquemin (A&J (1988)) and aims to determine the cooperative and non-cooperative R&D strategies for two agents of different size. The paper concludes that the introduction of asymmetry into the A&J (1988) model leads to different R&D expenditures and production decisions made by the firms. Simulations show that the bigger agent has larger R&D expenditures and higher output. If firms choose the monopoly collusion or the welfare-maximizing strategy, the optimal solution implies that R&D is conducted asymmetrically by both agents, but that production is conducted only by the largest agent.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 287

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft
• Thema: Innovation ; R&D ; spillovers ; cooperation

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Plasmans, Joseph
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
• (wo): Munich
• (wann): 2000

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/75661
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ