Artikel
Von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable sets in two-sided matching
We adopt the notion of von Neumann-Morgenstern (vNM) farsightedly stable sets to determine which matchings are possibly stable when agents are farsighted in one-to-one matching problems. We provide the characterization of vNM farsightedly stable sets: a set of matchings is a vNM farsightedly stable set if and only if it is a singleton subset of the core. Thus, contrary to the vNM (myopically) stable sets [Ehlers, J. of Econ. Theory 134 (2007), 537-547], vNM farsightedly stable sets cannot include matchings that are not in the core. Moreover, we show that our main result is robust to many-to-one matching problems with substitutable preferences: a set of matchings is a vNM farsightedly stable set if and only if it is a singleton set and its element is in the strong core.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Journal: Theoretical Economics ; ISSN: 1555-7561 ; Volume: 6 ; Year: 2011 ; Issue: 3 ; Pages: 499-521 ; New Haven, CT: The Econometric Society
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Game Theory and Bargaining Theory: General
Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- Subject
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Matching problem
von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets
farsighted stability
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Vannetelbosch, Vincent J.
Mauleon, Ana
Vergote, Wouter
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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The Econometric Society
- (where)
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New Haven, CT
- (when)
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2011
- DOI
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doi:10.3982/TE527
- Handle
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:41 AM CET
Data provider
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Object type
- Artikel
Associated
- Vannetelbosch, Vincent J.
- Mauleon, Ana
- Vergote, Wouter
- The Econometric Society
Time of origin
- 2011