Artikel

Von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable sets in two-sided matching

We adopt the notion of von Neumann-Morgenstern (vNM) farsightedly stable sets to determine which matchings are possibly stable when agents are farsighted in one-to-one matching problems. We provide the characterization of vNM farsightedly stable sets: a set of matchings is a vNM farsightedly stable set if and only if it is a singleton subset of the core. Thus, contrary to the vNM (myopically) stable sets [Ehlers, J. of Econ. Theory 134 (2007), 537-547], vNM farsightedly stable sets cannot include matchings that are not in the core. Moreover, we show that our main result is robust to many-to-one matching problems with substitutable preferences: a set of matchings is a vNM farsightedly stable set if and only if it is a singleton set and its element is in the strong core.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Journal: Theoretical Economics ; ISSN: 1555-7561 ; Volume: 6 ; Year: 2011 ; Issue: 3 ; Pages: 499-521 ; New Haven, CT: The Econometric Society

Classification
Wirtschaft
Game Theory and Bargaining Theory: General
Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
Subject
Matching problem
von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets
farsighted stability

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Vannetelbosch, Vincent J.
Mauleon, Ana
Vergote, Wouter
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
The Econometric Society
(where)
New Haven, CT
(when)
2011

DOI
doi:10.3982/TE527
Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:41 AM CET

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Object type

  • Artikel

Associated

  • Vannetelbosch, Vincent J.
  • Mauleon, Ana
  • Vergote, Wouter
  • The Econometric Society

Time of origin

  • 2011

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