Von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable sets in two-sided matching

Artikel

We adopt the notion of von Neumann-Morgenstern (vNM) farsightedly stable sets to determine which matchings are possibly stable when agents are farsighted in one-to-one matching problems. We provide the characterization of vNM farsightedly stable sets: a set of matchings is a vNM farsightedly stable set if and only if it is a singleton subset of the core. Thus, contrary to the vNM (myopically) stable sets [Ehlers, J. of Econ. Theory 134 (2007), 537-547], vNM farsightedly stable sets cannot include matchings that are not in the core. Moreover, we show that our main result is robust to many-to-one matching problems with substitutable preferences: a set of matchings is a vNM farsightedly stable set if and only if it is a singleton set and its element is in the strong core.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Journal: Theoretical Economics ; ISSN: 1555-7561 ; Volume: 6 ; Year: 2011 ; Issue: 3 ; Pages: 499-521 ; New Haven, CT: The Econometric Society

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Game Theory and Bargaining Theory: General ; Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
• Subject: Matching problem ; von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets ; farsighted stability

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Vannetelbosch, Vincent J. ; Mauleon, Ana ; Vergote, Wouter
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): The Econometric Society
• (where): New Haven, CT
• (when): 2011

Further information

• DOI: doi:10.3982/TE527
• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/150162
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:41 AM CET