Arbeitspapier
Job market signaling and employer learning
This paper extends the job market signaling model of Spence (1973) by allowing firms to learn the ability of their employees over time. Contrary to the model without employer learning, we find that the Intuitive Criterion does not always select a unique separating equilibrium. When the Intuitive Criterion bites and information is purely asymmetric, the separating level of education does not depend on the observability of workers' types. On the other hand, when workers are also uncertain about their productivity, the separating level of education is ambiguously related to the speed of employer learning.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 3285
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Education and Research Institutions: General
- Thema
-
Signaling
job markets
education
employer learning
intuitive criterion
Arbeitsmarkttheorie
Asymmetrische Information
Arbeitsangebot
Signalling
Arbeitsnachfrage
Unternehmer
Lernprozess
Theorie
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Alós-Ferrer, Carlos
Prat, Julien
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
- (wo)
-
Bonn
- (wann)
-
2008
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Alós-Ferrer, Carlos
- Prat, Julien
- Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
Entstanden
- 2008
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