Arbeitspapier

Job market signaling and employer learning

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This paper extends the job market signaling model of Spence (1973) by allowing firms to learn the ability of their employees over time. Contrary to the model without employer learning, we find that the Intuitive Criterion does not always select a unique separating equilibrium. When the Intuitive Criterion bites and information is purely asymmetric, the separating level of education does not depend on the observability of workers' types. On the other hand, when workers are also uncertain about their productivity, the separating level of education is ambiguously related to the speed of employer learning.

Language: Englisch

Bibliographic citation: Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 3285

Classification: Wirtschaft
Education and Research Institutions: General

Subject: Signaling
job markets
education
employer learning
intuitive criterion
Arbeitsmarkttheorie
Asymmetrische Information
Arbeitsangebot
Signalling
Arbeitsnachfrage
Unternehmer
Lernprozess
Theorie

Event: Geistige Schöpfung

(who): Alós-Ferrer, Carlos
Prat, Julien

Event: Veröffentlichung

(who): Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)

(where): Bonn

(when): 2008

Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/35236

Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET

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Object type

Arbeitspapier

Associated

Alós-Ferrer, Carlos
Prat, Julien
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)

Time of origin

2008

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