Arbeitspapier
Employer Market Power in Silicon Valley
Adam Smith alleged that secret employer collusion to reduce labor earnings is common. This paper examines an important case of such behavior: no-poach agreements through which technology companies agreed not to compete for each other's workers. Exploiting the plausibly exogenous timing of a US Department of Justice investigation, I estimate the effects of these agreements using a difference-in-differences design. Data from Glassdoor permit the inclusion of rich employer- and job-level controls. Estimates indicate each agreement cost affected workers approximately 2.5 percent of annual salary. Stock bonuses and ratings of job satisfaction were also negatively affected.
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 14843
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Monopsony; Segmented Labor Markets
Antitrust Law
Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs: General
Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
- Thema
-
monopsony
oligopsony
employer market power
labor earnings
- Ereignis
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Gibson, Matthew
- Ereignis
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Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
- (wo)
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Bonn
- (wann)
-
2021
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
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10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Gibson, Matthew
- Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
Entstanden
- 2021