Arbeitspapier

Employer Market Power in Silicon Valley

Adam Smith alleged that secret employer collusion to reduce labor earnings is common. This paper examines an important case of such behavior: no-poach agreements through which technology companies agreed not to compete for each other's workers. Exploiting the plausibly exogenous timing of a US Department of Justice investigation, I estimate the effects of these agreements using a difference-in-differences design. Data from Glassdoor permit the inclusion of rich employer- and job-level controls. Estimates indicate each agreement cost affected workers approximately 2.5 percent of annual salary. Stock bonuses and ratings of job satisfaction were also negatively affected.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 14843

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Monopsony; Segmented Labor Markets
Antitrust Law
Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs: General
Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
Thema
monopsony
oligopsony
employer market power
labor earnings

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Gibson, Matthew
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
(wo)
Bonn
(wann)
2021

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Gibson, Matthew
  • Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Entstanden

  • 2021

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