A class of N-player Colonel Blotto games with multidimensional private information

Arbeitspapier

We consider a class of incomplete-information Colonel Blotto games in which N Ï 2 agents are engaged in (N + 1) battlefields. An agent's vector of battlefield valuations is drawn from a generalized sphere in Lp-space. We identify a Bayes-Nash equilibrium in which any agent's resource allocation to a given battlefield is strictly monotone in the agent's valuation of that battlefield. In contrast to the single-unit case, however, agents never enjoy any information rent. We also outline an extension to networks of Blotto games.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Working Paper ; No. 336

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Noncooperative Games ; Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior ; Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
• Subject: Colonel Blotto games ; private information ; Bayes-Nash equilibrium ; information rents ; networks

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Ewerhart, Christian ; Kovenock, Daniel J.
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): University of Zurich, Department of Economics
• (where): Zurich
• (when): 2019

Further information

• DOI: doi:10.5167/uzh-176995
• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/206852
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET