Arbeitspapier
A class of N-player Colonel Blotto games with multidimensional private information
We consider a class of incomplete-information Colonel Blotto games in which N Ï 2 agents are engaged in (N + 1) battlefields. An agent's vector of battlefield valuations is drawn from a generalized sphere in Lp-space. We identify a Bayes-Nash equilibrium in which any agent's resource allocation to a given battlefield is strictly monotone in the agent's valuation of that battlefield. In contrast to the single-unit case, however, agents never enjoy any information rent. We also outline an extension to networks of Blotto games.
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: Working Paper ; No. 336
- Klassifikation
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Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- Thema
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Colonel Blotto games
private information
Bayes-Nash equilibrium
information rents
networks
- Ereignis
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
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Ewerhart, Christian
Kovenock, Daniel J.
- Ereignis
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Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
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University of Zurich, Department of Economics
- (wo)
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Zurich
- (wann)
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2019
- DOI
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doi:10.5167/uzh-176995
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
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10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Ewerhart, Christian
- Kovenock, Daniel J.
- University of Zurich, Department of Economics
Entstanden
- 2019