Arbeitspapier

A class of N-player Colonel Blotto games with multidimensional private information

We consider a class of incomplete-information Colonel Blotto games in which N Ï 2 agents are engaged in (N + 1) battlefields. An agent's vector of battlefield valuations is drawn from a generalized sphere in Lp-space. We identify a Bayes-Nash equilibrium in which any agent's resource allocation to a given battlefield is strictly monotone in the agent's valuation of that battlefield. In contrast to the single-unit case, however, agents never enjoy any information rent. We also outline an extension to networks of Blotto games.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Working Paper ; No. 336

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Thema
Colonel Blotto games
private information
Bayes-Nash equilibrium
information rents
networks

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Ewerhart, Christian
Kovenock, Daniel J.
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
University of Zurich, Department of Economics
(wo)
Zurich
(wann)
2019

DOI
doi:10.5167/uzh-176995
Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Ewerhart, Christian
  • Kovenock, Daniel J.
  • University of Zurich, Department of Economics

Entstanden

  • 2019

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