Arbeitspapier
Disciplining and Screening Top Executives
Boards of directors face the twin task of disciplining and screening executives. To perform these tasks directors do not have detailed information about executives' behaviour, and only infrequently have information about the success or failure of initiated strategies, reorganizations, mergers etc. We analyse the nature of (implicit) retention contracts boards use to discipline and screen executives. Consistent with empirical observation, we find that executives may become overly active to show their credentials; that the link between bad performance and dismissal is weak; and that boards occasionally dismiss competent executives.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; No. 06-054/1
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Corporate Finance and Governance: General
Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Voting; Proxy Contests; Corporate Governance
- Thema
-
board of directors
turnover
retention contracts
selection
moral hazard
empire building
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Martinez, Silvia Dominguez
Swank, Otto H.
Visser, Bauke
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Tinbergen Institute
- (wo)
-
Amsterdam and Rotterdam
- (wann)
-
2006
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Martinez, Silvia Dominguez
- Swank, Otto H.
- Visser, Bauke
- Tinbergen Institute
Entstanden
- 2006
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