Arbeitspapier
Fiscal and monetary interaction : the role of asymmetries of the stability and growth pact in EMU
The paper builds a simplified model describing the economy of a currency union with decentralised national fiscal policy, where the main features characterising the policy-making are similar to those in EMU. National governments choose the size of deficit taking into account the two main rules of the Stability and Growth Pact on public finance. Unlike previous literature the asymmetric working of those rules is explicitly modelled in order to identify its impact on the Nash equilibrium of deficits arising from a game of strategic interaction between fiscal authorities in the union.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 1354
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination
- Thema
-
Stability and Growth Pact
EMU
asymmetric fiscal rules
decentralised fiscal policy
Europäische Wirtschafts- und Währungsunion
EU-Stabilitätspakt
Finanzpolitik
Internationale wirtschaftspolitische Koordination
EU-Staaten
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Governatori, Matteo
Eijffinger, Sylvester C. W.
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (wo)
-
Munich
- (wann)
-
2004
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Governatori, Matteo
- Eijffinger, Sylvester C. W.
- Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Entstanden
- 2004