Arbeitspapier

Macroeconomic stabilization policies in the EMU : spillovers, asymmetries, and institutions

This paper studies the institutional design of the coordination of macroeconomic stabilization policies within a monetary union in the framework of linear quadratic differential games. A central role in the analysis plays the partitioned game approach of the endogenous coalition formation literature. The specific policy recommendations in the EMU context depend on the particular characteristics of the shocks and the economic structure. In the case of a common shock, fiscal coordination or full policy coordination is desirable. When asymmetric shocks are considered, fiscal coordination improves the performance but full policy coordination doesn?t produce further gains in policymakers? welfare.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 1376

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Comparative or Joint Analysis of Fiscal and Monetary Policy; Stabilization; Treasury Policy
Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination
Central Banks and Their Policies
General Aggregative Models: Forecasting and Simulation: Models and Applications
Game Theory and Bargaining Theory: General
Thema
macroeconomic stabilization
EMU
coalition formation
linear quadratic differential games
Konjunkturpolitik
Europäische Wirtschafts- und Währungsunion
Internationale wirtschaftspolitische Koordination
Geldpolitik
Finanzpolitik
Koalition
Nichtkooperatives Spiel
Asymmetrische Information
Schock
Theorie

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Di Bartolomeo, Giovanni
Engwerda, Jacob
Plasmans, Joseph
van Aarle, Bas
Michalak, Tomasz
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(wo)
Munich
(wann)
2005

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Di Bartolomeo, Giovanni
  • Engwerda, Jacob
  • Plasmans, Joseph
  • van Aarle, Bas
  • Michalak, Tomasz
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Entstanden

  • 2005

Ähnliche Objekte (12)