Lying to appear honest

Abstract: This paper studies individual truth-telling behavior in the presence of multiple lying opportunities with heterogeneous stake sizes. The results show that individuals lie downwards (i.e. forgo money due to their lie) in low-stakes situations in order to signal honesty, and thereby mitigate the image repercussions of upward lying in high-stakes contexts. This constitutes first evidence of systematic downward lying in an unobserved lying game. The observed behavior is consistent with the spirit, but not the letter, of the prominent models of lying behavior. It therefore presents a challenge for these models

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• Location: Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main
• Extent: Online-Ressource, 21 S.
• Language: Englisch
• Notes: Veröffentlichungsversion ; begutachtet

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Discussion Papers / Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung, Forschungsschwerpunkt Markt und Entscheidung, Abteilung Ökonomik des Wandels ; Bd. SP II 2019-307

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Sozialwissenschaften, Soziologie, Anthropologie ; Psychologie

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (where): Mannheim
• (who): SSOAR, GESIS – Leibniz-Institut für Sozialwissenschaften e.V.
• (when): 2019
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (where): Berlin
• (who): Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung gGmbH
• (when): 2019
• Creator: Barron, Kai
• Contributor: Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung gGmbH

Further information

• URN: urn:nbn:de:101:1-2021101108544066408453
• Rights: Open Access; Der Zugriff auf das Objekt ist unbeschränkt möglich.