Arbeitspapier
Rent Taxation when Cost Tranfers are Possible, but Costly
While rent taxation in some theories is neutral, and the tax rate could not be set to one hundred percent to minimize the need for distortionary taxes, this does not occur in practice. An important reason for this is the transfer incentives that would result. Monitoring to prevent transfer pricing is difficult, in particular on the cost side. For dorporations, monitoring implies that both transfer pricing and real transfers will be costly. Assuming a convex cost function for cost transfers, it is shown that the optimal tax system combines a cash flow tax with a royalty, i.e., a tax on gross revenues.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Series: Memorandum ; No. 20/1998
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
Taxation and Subsidies: Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
Taxation and Subsidies: Incidence
- Subject
-
rent
taxation
pricing
income
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Halvorsen, H.E.
Lund, D.
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
-
University of Oslo, Department of Economics
- (where)
-
Oslo
- (when)
-
1998
- Handle
- Last update
-
07.03.2025, 12:36 AM CET
Data provider
This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Halvorsen, H.E.
- Lund, D.
- University of Oslo, Department of Economics
Time of origin
- 1998
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