Merger policy with merger choice

Arbeitspapier

We analyze the optimal policy of an antitrust authority towards horizontal mergers when merger proposals are endogenous and firms choose which of several mutually exclusive mergers to propose. The optimal policy of an antitrust authority that seeks to maximize expected consumer surplus involves discriminating between mergers based on a naive computation of the post-merger Herfindahl index (over and above the apparent effect of the proposed merger on consumer surplus). We show that the antitrust authority optimally imposes a tougher standard on those mergers that raise the index by more.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: CSIO Working Paper ; No. 0112

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Nocke, Volker ; Whinston, Michael D.
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Northwestern University, Center for the Study of Industrial Organization (CSIO)
• (where): Evanston, IL
• (when): 2011

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/92484
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET