Journal article | Zeitschriftenartikel

Tax policy and yardstick voting in Flemish municipal elections

Recent theoretical papers develop political agency models in which voters compare tax policy with that in neighbouring jurisdictions. In these yardstick competition models voters judge incumbents by comparing their policy with policy in neighbouring jurisdictions. We analyse municipal elections in Flanders during the period 1982-2000 and find empirical evidence for yardstick voting. Incumbents are punished for higher tax rates. Importantly, the electoral punishment also depends on tax rates in neighbouring municipalities. Higher rates in neighbouring municipalities are favourable for the incumbents.

Tax policy and yardstick voting  
in Flemish municipal elections

Tax policy and yardstick voting in Flemish municipal elections | Urheber*in: Vermeir, Jan; Heyndels, Bruno

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Extent
Seite(n): 2285-2298
Language
Englisch
Notes
Status: Postprint; begutachtet (peer reviewed)

Bibliographic citation
Applied Economics, 38(19)

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Vermeir, Jan
Heyndels, Bruno
Event
Veröffentlichung
(when)
2006

DOI
URN
urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-239238
Rights
GESIS - Leibniz-Institut für Sozialwissenschaften. Bibliothek Köln
Last update
21.06.2024, 4:27 PM CEST

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Object type

  • Zeitschriftenartikel

Associated

  • Vermeir, Jan
  • Heyndels, Bruno

Time of origin

  • 2006

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